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This paper presents an overview of the regulatory framework for wind energy in European Union
Member States. The analysis covers three main aspects of regulatory framework: support schemes,
electrical grid issues and potential barriers for wind power deployment. The aim is not just to provide an
updated picture of current (early-2015) regulatory framework, but also to analyse the past evolution and
trends (in order to achieve the targets of renewable energy share set for 2020). Each country implements
a speciﬁc regulatory framework driven by several factors: their own renewable energy targets, local
availability of renewable resources, energy mix structure, existing infrastructures as well as other factors
such as public perception or geographical distribution of electricity generation and consumption points.
The results presented in this paper show a trend for increasing themarket exposure of wind generators; feed-
in premiums and competitive bidding procedures to establish the support level are gaining prominence in the last
few years. In relation to grid issues, it is a commonpractice that newwind generators only bear the grid extension
costs to the closest connection point; priority or guaranteed access is granted in most Member States and wind
generators are usually not demanded to meet balancing requirements (this is expected to change in the next few
years following the new guidelines provided by the European Commission). The analysis of potential barriers for
wind energy deployment shows that the stability of regulatory framework is one of the most important concerns
for investors. Finally, actual deployment over the last few years has been linked with evolution of regulatory
frameworks. This analysis shows that some Member States have shown a strong commitment supporting wind
energy; however, in other countries the support has not been enough to stimulate the desired level of investment.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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The Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC [1] established a
European framework to promote renewable energy by setting
mandatory national targets in order to achieve at least a 20%
renewable energy share in ﬁnal energy by 2020. Each Member
State (MS) was required, by June 2010, to set out the sectoral
targets by their National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs).
Each individual plan deﬁned the technology mix scenario, the
trajectory to be followed and the measures and reforms to over-
come barriers and ensure the developing of renewable energy.
According to the plan deﬁned in the NREAPs, wind energy has a
signiﬁcant role in order to achieve the 2020 renewable energy
targets: expected installed capacity by 2020 in the European Union
(EU) is 209.6 GW (165.6 GW onshore and 43.9 GW offshore). These
ﬁgures would account for a 43.1%1 of renewable electricity tech-
nologies installed by 2020 (34.0% corresponds to onshore and 9.1%
to offshore wind energy).
Under these circumstances the regulatory framework has a
vital role in order to attract new investors and achieve a proper
level of deployment. Not only the additional income provided by
support schemes is important but also other aspects — as reg-
ulatory stability, non-complex permitting and connection proce-
dure, market structure or absence of other potential barriers — are
also vital drivers to promote the installation of new wind farms.
The existing literature about regulatory framework to promote
the deployment of renewable energy sources is extensive. In 2010
Hiroux and Saguan [2] discussed how electricity markets could be
designed in order to host a signiﬁcant amount of wind energy,
concluding that wind power producers should be exposed to
market signals. To this end, a feed-in premium (FiP) seems to be a
suitable option, since the risk for producers is controlled to some
extent and renewable generators are exposed to market signals. In
2012 Couture and Gagnon [3] presented the advantages and dis-
advantages of different design options for feed-in tariffs (FiTs) and
FiPs. Speciﬁc features such as inﬂation adjustment, degression rate
(predeﬁned tariff decrease with time for new installations) and
ﬂoor or ceiling price are analysed by identifying the impact on risk
for investors, and overall cost of renewable energy deployment.
The evolution of support schemes during 2000–2011 was analysed
by Kitzing et al. [4], concluding that a slight tendency is observed
for a bottom-up convergence of regulatory frameworks in EU MSs.
Lemming [5] studied in 2003 the risk implications by ana-
lysing how the higher risk associated to tradable green certiﬁ-
cates (TGCs) markets — compared with FiTs — results in higher
income required by investors. A similar conclusion on the rela-
tionship between risk and return requirements by investors was
drawn by Held et al. [6] in 2006. Also in 2006 Dinica [7] focused
on the perspective of investors and concluded that it is necessary
to take into account factors other than the ﬁnancing and eco-
nomic obstacles. Klessmann et al. [6] in 2008 analysed the con-
sequences of market risk exposure in Germany, Spain and the
United Kingdom, analysing both price and forecasting/balancing
risks. If wind generators are responsible for balancing, there is an
incentive for producers to minimise imbalance costs with the
consequent beneﬁts for the grid. Conversely, this approach would
lead to higher risk premiums (especially for the case of small
producers, since the forecasting quality improves for aggregated
generators). This fact may also lead to a market concentration of
larger players. Furthermore, as the predictability of wind is lim-
ited, liquid intraday and balancing markets are necessary for1 In this calculation Czech Republic and Estonia are not considered since total
renewable energy capacity to be installed by 2020 is not speciﬁed in the NREAP.
Nevertheless, Czech Republic deﬁnes 743 MWof onshore wind by 2020 and Estonia
650 MW (400 MW onshore and 250 offshore).efﬁcient integration of wind generators in the electricity market.
Klessmann et al. [8] showed in 2013 that risk-sensitive policies
are crucial for attracting investors by: (i) reducing ﬁnancing costs,
(ii) decreasing project development costs and (iii) increasing
market revenues. The authors remarked that policy and admin-
istrative risks can be reduced at low cost, since exposing projects
to this kind of risk does not produce any positive effect from a
macro-economic point of view. In 2007 Breukers and Wolsink [9]
analysed the conditions that affected the local planning contexts
and social acceptance in the Netherlands, England, and the Ger-
man state of North Rhine Westphalia. The authors pointed out
that facilitating local ownership and institutionalising in project
planning can help to a higher local social acceptance. This study
was later expanded in 2008 [10], by analysing in detail certain
social and institutional aspects (namely, planning, local owner-
ship, landscape and ﬁnancial support) which also affected wind
energy deployment in six European countries: Denmark, Spain,
Germany, Scotland, the Netherlands, and England/Wales. This
study concluded that, despite different approaches implemented,
planning policies in the analysed countries/regions favoured
wind energy deployment. However, strength of landscape pro-
tection organisations as well as local ownership patterns varied
considerably among the studied countries.
In 2011, Klessmann et al. [11] evaluated the status of renew-
able energy deployment in the EU by means of the effectiveness
indicator presented in [12]. The results showed that during the
period 2003–2009 the highest average policy effectiveness was
reached for onshore wind (4.2%), followed by biofuels (3.6%)
biomass electricity (2.7%), biogas (1.6%) and photovoltaic (1.5%).
Germany was the country with the highest effectiveness indi-
cator for onshore wind (10.2%), followed by Spain (7.4%) and
Portugal (7.1%). Haas et al. [13] also argued that FiTs provide
higher deployment and at lower costs than TGCs systems, and
suggested that the better performance of FiTs is mainly because
(i) FiTs are easy to implement and can be revised to account for
new capacities in a very short time; (ii) administration costs are
lower than in case of trading schemes and (iii) FiTs can be easily
tailored to each speciﬁc technology.
The inﬂuence of grid issues on the deployment of wind energy
has also been an issue studied in detail in the scientiﬁc literature.
In 2008, Barth et al. [14] described the different approaches for
connection costs allocation. The research remarks that grid con-
nection costs are clearly attributable to renewable generators but
grid reinforcement costs cannot be attributed solely to one source.
However, it is also stated that performing a fair distribution of
these costs is not easy. The authors remark that deep (or semi-
deep) connection charges can be used to address the speciﬁc
needs in a certain location of the grid by taking into account the
generation/consumption proﬁle. This kind of grid connection
charges incentivises investors to place new generators in regions
with scarce electricity supply, rather than to put them in regions
with already abundant generation. Swider et al. [15] compared the
grid connection conditions and costs in selected European coun-
tries (Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
Austria, Lithuania and Slovenia); the research concludes that the
allocation of connection costs can be an important barrier for
renewable energy installations if the developer has to bear all of
them. The implications of connection cost sharing for offshore
wind energy were discussed by Weißensteiner et al. [16] who
found that offshore installations passing the grid connection costs
to grid operators result in lower surplus for the producers and,
hence, lower transfer costs for ﬁnal consumers.
The factors inﬂuencing energy curtailment were analysed in
2007 by Porter et al. [17]. Flexibility of generating mix, existence of
well-functioning electricity markets, geographical distribution of
the wind resource, capacity of transmission and size of the control
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renewable generators. In 2010, Vandezande et al. [18] discussed
the necessity of balancing requirements for wind farms in case of
high penetration scenarios. Finally, Batlle et al. [19] stated in 2012
that exposing renewable energy generators to the cost of imbal-
ances enhances their ability to estimate their production and
hence minimising the cost of reserves for the whole system.
The aim of this paper is to identify the current state and trends
of regulatory framework for wind energy in EU MSs in order to
achieve the 2020 renewable energy targets. With this purpose, this
paper is divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part presents a description
of main aspects of regulatory framework and the second part links
the actual developments with the evolution of regulatory aspects
in the last few years.
After this brief introduction, the remainder of the paper is
organised as follows: support schemes for wind energy currently
in force in each MS will be featured in Section 2, main aspects
concerning grid issues (connection procedure, distribution of grid
connection costs and operational conditions) are introduced in
Section 3. Other regulatory and non-regulatory aspects that can
inﬂuence on wind energy diffusion are presented in Section 4.
Evolution and changes on support schemes are analysed and
compared with actual developments in Section 4. Finally, conclu-
sions and key ﬁndings are summarised in Section 5.2 In the context of this work, support schemes aimed to micro-wind energy are
not studied in further detail.2. Support schemes for wind energy promotion
Support to renewable energy is usually performed by the
combination of several measures. FiTs, FIPs, tenders, quota obli-
gations (combined with TGCs) or Contracts for Difference (CfDs)
are usually applied as major support instruments. Whilst, invest-
ments grants, ﬁscal measures and ﬁnancing are employed to
provide an extra level of support. A brief description of these
promotion mechanisms is provided below. Notwithstanding, we
would like to refer to [3,4,6,20] for a thorough explanation of
support schemes.
Feed-in tariffs. A FiT offers a long-term purchase agreement for
the sale of renewable electricity. Usually, FiTs include three key
points: (i) guarantee of dispatch, (ii) long-term agreements and
(iii) payment levels based on the costs of technology.
Feed-in premium. FiP tariffs are deﬁned as market-dependent
mechanisms. An add-on is paid for each unit of produced energy
in addition to the incomes of selling this energy into the electricity
market. There are two types of FiPs currently in force: (i) a ﬁxed
add-on is offered over the market price and (ii) a variable add-on
is paid over the market price to achieve a previously deﬁned target
tariff. The latter type of FiP is referred in the literature as sliding
FiP or spot gap market model [3]. Under this model wind gen-
erators participate in the market but eventually receive (alike a
FiT) a ﬁxed amount regardless the spot market price.
Tenders. Under this procedure plant developers present their
bid for a certain remuneration taking into account the technical
speciﬁcations set in the call for tenders. The winning bid is
selected by considering both technical and economic merit.
Quota system and tradable green certiﬁcates. This support tech-
nique is market-based, since the price of the TGCs is deﬁned by
market equilibrium between the supply and demand for certiﬁ-
cates. Demand is driven by a determined target for renewable
energy consumption, i.e., the quotas deﬁned as a percentage of
energy generated by renewable energy sources. Certiﬁcates are
tradable ﬁnancial assets sold on a speciﬁc market. Thus, the
additional cost of producing renewable energy (compared with
conventional sources) is compensated by the extra incomes for the
sale of certiﬁcates.Tax incentives or exemptions. An extra level of support can be
provided by exempting (or relieving) renewable energy generators
of paying certain taxes. These promotions techniques are con-
sidered to be highly ﬂexible policy tools that are targeted to
encourage speciﬁc renewable energy technologies, especially
when used in combination with other policy instruments [21].
Investment grants. This support instrument is typically used to
stimulate certain technologies at early stage of development.
Financing incentives. This category of policy scheme assists the
ﬁnancing of renewable projects by promoting or offering loans
with a rate below the market rate of interest. This support can also
consist of providing longer payment periods or phases without
interest payment.
In November 2013 the European Commission called for a
higher market exposure of renewable generators in its guidance
for the design of renewables support schemes [22]. Under these
guidelines, the Commission recommends preference for FiPs over
FiTs. According to the desired exposure of renewable generators to
risk, the premium can be set as a ﬁxed amount over the electricity
market price or as a sliding premium to achieve an objective price.
Tenders or auctions are also a recommended practice to foster the
competition and track the actual costs of technology. These com-
petitive bidding procedures can be used to allocate the support
provided by different instruments as FiPs, support to investment
or TGCs. Along the same lines, the Guidelines on State aid for
environmental protection and energy 2014–2020 [23], published in
June 2014, call for support mechanisms consistent with ensuring
the transition to a cost-effective delivery through market-based
mechanisms. The guidelines set the following conditions to be
applied from 1 January 2016 (except for wind farms with an
installed power lower than 3 MW or composed by less than three
wind turbines): (i) the support is provided as premium to be paid
in addition to the market price, (ii) renewable generators will be
subject to balancing responsibilities (unless no liquid intra-day
markets exist), (iii) measures have to be taken to avoid renewable
generators producing electricity under negative prices. Addition-
ally during the period 2015–2016, the support has to be estab-
lished by a competitive bidding process for at least 5% of the new
renewable capacity. This condition is extended for all new projects
from 1 January 2017. Unless MSs demonstrate that (i) a very lim-
ited number of projects are eligible, (ii) competitive bidding would
lead to higher support levels and (iii) competitive procedures
would result in low projects realisation.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of support schemes currently applied
for new installations in MSs. Cells in dark blue refer to schemes for
onshore wind energy, orange cells correspond to schemes tailored
to offshore wind energy, light blue cells indicate those cases where
support is only offered for micro-wind energy2 and grey cells
represent support schemes that are applicable to other technolo-
gies than wind energy.
2.1. Support schemes for onshore wind energy
Table 1 summarises the speciﬁc features of FiTs offered for new
onshore wind power plants among MSs. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Greece and Slovakia apply a ﬁxed FiT model without indexing to
inﬂation. Ireland indexes the remuneration to inﬂation.
A variant of the spot market gap method is used in some MSs
(as shown in Table 2). For example, Finland implements a FiP
calculated as the difference between the target price and the
average price of electricity in the preceding three months. This
premium is annually adjusted according to the average price of
Fig. 1. Overview of support instruments in EU MS in 2014 (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Summary of FiTs in 2014 for onshore wind energy support implemented in MSs
(compiled from [24–26]).
Country Amount (€/MW h) Period (years)
Austria 93.6 13
Bulgaria 95.55 BGN/MW h (49€/MW h)a 12
Croatia Depending on reference price 14




a Considering an exchange rate: 1 EUR ¼ 1.96 BGN.
b Wind farms above 5 MW. 82€/MW h for wind farms in the interconnected
grid (105€/MW h if no capital grant was received); in not interconnected islands:
90€/MW h (110€/MW h if no capital grant was received).
c For wind farms with more than 5 MW.
Table 2
Summary of FiPs – spot gap market model – for 2014 for onshore wind energy
support implemented in MSs (compiled from [24,27,28]).
Country Target price (€/MW h) Eligibility period
Finland 83.5a, 12
Germany Years 0–5: 89; years 6–20: 49.5b 20
Slovenia o10 MW: 95.38; o125 MW: 86.75c 20
a If the average market price drops under 30€/MW h, the subsidised amount is
calculated as the target price minus 30€/MW h. An early bird premium is con-
sidered for wind farms installed before 31/12/2015 with a target price of 105.3
€/MW h for the ﬁrst three years. A cap of Maximum installed capacity of 2.5 GW is
considered.
b An extension of the initial period is granted by taking into account the wind
resource at the location of the wind farm with respect to a reference value (mean
wind speed: 5.5 m/s at 30 m with roughness length 0.1 m).
c Reference prices to calculate the premium as the reference price minus the
average electricity market price multiplied by a factor (0.8 up to 10 MWand 0.86 up
to 50 MW).
Table 3





Denmark 250 DKK/MW h;
(33.5€/MW h)a,
23 DKK/MW h (3.1
€/MW h) for covering
balance
6600 Equivalent
hours plus 5.6 MW h/
m2 b
Estonia 53.7c – 12
a Considering an exchange rate: 1 EUR¼7.46 DKK.
b The wind farm will receive the FiP for a number of hours resulting from the
sum of two concepts: 6600 equivalent full load hours plus 5.6 MW h per each
square metre of rotor area.
c A annual cap of (maximum 600 GW h/yr) generated energy is taken into
account for wind energy.
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minus the average electricity price during the previous month.
Also Slovenia applies a variant of this scheme where the premium
is calculated as the reference value minus the average price mul-
tiplied by a certain factor.
An overview of currently available FiPs in Denmark and Estonia
is presented in Table 3. Both MSs offer a ﬁxed add-on over the top
of the market price, but Denmark sets a ceiling to the sum of
market price plus premium (maximum 80€/MW h).
Tenders are gaining prominence as support scheme in EU MSs.
Usually tenders are applied to determine the ﬁxed remuneration
to be received by plant operators during the eligibility period. This
is the case of France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Lithuania.
In the Netherlands a speciﬁc tender procedure is used to
determine the target price (alike a sliding FiP). The procedure
consists of six stages depending on the application date of the
plant. The later the generator applied, the higher the target price.
However, the total budget of the programme is capped to 3.5 b€(taking into account all renewable energy technologies and
renewable heat and cogeneration) and the procedure is based on a
ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served principle. Latter applications face the risk
of not being eligible for subsidies. Table 4 shows the corresponding
amount depending on the tender stage.
A newmodel was introduced in the United Kingdom: a FiT with
CfD. Under this remuneration scheme wind generators will receive
the previously deﬁned-by-auction strike price. Generators are
required to participate in the market and, in case the market price
is lower than the strike price, the difference is covered by the CfD
counterparty, i.e., the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC).
Conversely, if the market price is higher than the strike price the
generator pays back the difference to the LCCC.
The new support scheme introduced in Spain is also based in a
tender procedure. Bidders specify a series of parameters (includ-
ing, among others, the life span of the project, number of
equivalent hours and lower/upper limits of electricity prices).
These parameters are employed to determine the bidding variable:
the reduction percentage over the standard value of the initial
investment for the reference installation. Once the winner of the
tender is selected, the remuneration for investment (covering the
investment costs that cannot be recovered by selling the generated
energy in the market) is calculated according to the procedure set
in the Spanish Royal Decree 413/2014.
2.2. Tradable green certiﬁcates and quota obligation for onshore
wind power
Belgium, Sweden, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom
apply TGCs and quotas to promote wind energy. Table 5 sum-
marises the main features and particularities in each case. In the
United Kingdom, one certiﬁcate is issued for each 1.11 MW h of
energy produced by an onshore wind farm. A different approach is
applied in the Belgian regions of Wallonia and Brussels by issuing
the green certiﬁcates indexed to the amount of CO2 saved. In
Romania 1.5 certiﬁcates per MW h are issued till 2017 and 0.75
certiﬁcates per MW h from 2018. The penalty, to be paid by elec-
tricity suppliers, for missing a certiﬁcate ranges from 72.9€ in
Table 5
Main features of TGCs in EU MS (compiled from [24,31,32]).
Penalty (€) Minimum (€) Maximum (€) Validity (years) Eligibility period (years)
Belgium (Brussels) 100 65 – 5
Belgium (Wallonia) 100 65 – 5 10þ5a
Belgium (Flanders) 100 93 – 15
Sweden b – 15c
Poland 303 PNL (72.94€)d – –
Romania 526.07 RON (119.29€)e 129.12 RON 29.28 263.06 RON 59.65 Till end 2016 15
UK f 20
a The quota system will expire on 31 March 2017. During the transition period, owners can choose between both support schemes (TGCs or CfDs).
b 150% of average price of unsatisﬁed obligation period.
c 15 years (in any case, eligibility will cease at the end of 2035 at the latest).
d Considering an exchange rate: 1 EUR¼4.17 PNL.
e Considering an exchange rate of 1 EUR¼4.41 RON.
f Buy-out price plus ﬁve per cent interest.
Table 4
FiP received for onshore wind farms in the Netherlands relate to the application date. In parenthesis the maximum of full-hours equivalent is indicated [30].















87.5 (2960) 100 (2960) 112.5 (2320) 121.3 (2320) 121.3 (2320) 121.3 (2320)
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calculated as a function of the buy-out price during the period of
the missing certiﬁcate plus interests.
2.3. Discussion on evolution of support schemes
As it will be shown later, the current state of regulatory fra-
mework is the result of an evolution. Continuous changes have
been performed, because as the renewable energy sector matures
policy-makers have to face new challenges:
 Technological/cost evolution. Rigid schemes that are not able to
respond to quick falls of production costs have to be adapted in
order to avoid overcompensation and excessive demand for
new installations [22].
 Macro-economic changes. The global economic crisis inﬂuenced
some national budgets, which affected the level of support.
 Objectives of renewable energy sharing. As shares of renewable
electricity progress, policymakers need to address new chal-
lenges and priorities; moving from promoting an initial
expansion of the sector to ensuring continuous development
with lower or no economic support.
Despite amendments in support policy being necessary, they are
also a factor that may hinder the conﬁdence of investors. For this
reason, stability and transparency are critical issues that can inﬂu-
ence drastically the development of renewable energy markets. Loss
of conﬁdence is especially severe when the changes and new mea-
sures are applied with retrospective or retroactive character [22].
Policymakers can play an important role in reducing policy and
regulatory risks. A proper design of the scheme and of the
administrative procedures in the permitting process is essential in
order to reduce uncertainty. This would not only avoid discoura-
ging investors, but would also reduce the overall cost of the sup-
port scheme. Higher risk needs to be compensated with higher
remuneration levels in order to keep the support scheme attrac-
tive for investors. According to Rathmann et al. [33], the levelised
cost of renewable energy could be reduced by up to 10% if marketplayers do not expect sudden policy changes. Similar conclusions
(about 5–10% reduction) were drawn by de Jager et al. [21].
2.4. Suspension of support schemes and retrospective measures
There are some MSs that, for different reasons, currently do not
provide any of the main support schemes (FiTs, premiums or
TGCs). Cyprus stopped wind energy support for new projects with
the exception of a 30 MW ongoing development. In France fol-
lowing a ruling issued by the European Court of Justice, the con-
ditions for the purchase of electricity produced by wind power
plants were abolished on 28 May 2014. The old regulation applied
exemptions to certain industries from the surcharge, Contribution
au Service Public de l'Electricité, which was found to be against EU
state aid regulations.
In January 2012, Spain suspended the existing support schemes
for promoting new renewable energy installations after having
introduced several retroactive changes. The price regulation sys-
tem was eventually phased out. A new remuneration scheme
entered into force in June 2014. Additionally, a series of retro-
spective measures have been put into force in recent years
affecting the income of renewable energy producers: modiﬁcation
of the reward system for reactive power control, annual cap of
equivalent production hours and a 7% ﬂat rate tax applied on the
gross revenues for electricity sale [34].
In October 2014, a new policy for renewable energy support was
published in Portugal. This new policy does not consider any support
for large scale projects, just for micro- and mini-generation. Portugal
had stopped supporting new installations in 2012 and negotiated a
levy on existing wind producers to avoid overcompensation.
In August 2013, the Czech Republic abolished the FiT scheme
for all renewable technologies except for small hydro. However,
wind power plants obtained the approval of their building permits
before 31 December 2013 which will be entitled for support if they
are put into operation before 31 December 2015 [24].
Additionally, several MSs introduced retrospective measures [35]:
 In Wallonia (Belgium), some municipalities are adopting special
taxes over new and existing wind turbines [36]. Also in Wallonia,
J.S. González, R. Lacal-Arántegui / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 56 (2016) 588–602 593a speciﬁc fee for green electricity producers has been introduced
in mid-2012.
 In Bulgaria, since May 2012, the connection to the grid of
renewable plants with a preliminary grid connection contract
was postponed to 2016. Furthermore, since mid-March 2014,
the distribution system companies have been limiting the
maximum power generation of all wind and photovoltaic power
plants by 60% [34].
 Greece imposed in 2012 a levy on the gross income of all
operating RES projects.
 The Polish indexing of green certiﬁcate prices to inﬂation was
removed [34].
 Romania introduced in 2013 retroactive regulatory changes that
fundamentally changed the economics for existing installations.
Mandatory acquisition quotas for green certiﬁcates — which
were deﬁned by law till 2020 — were slashed drastically (in
2014, the quota reductions were over 25%, as the obligation was
reduced from 15% to 11.1%); energy-intensive companies where
exempted largely without redistribution of the obligations; the
validity of green certiﬁcates was reduced from 16 months to 12
months; the envisaged implementation of the guaranty fund,
that should have bought excess green certiﬁcates, was repealed.
All these measures resulted in green certiﬁcate prices being cut
and caused oversupply. Furthermore, half of the green certiﬁ-
cates produced between 2013 and 2017 were delayed to the
period of 2018 and 2020. Finally, a construction tax of 1.5%
yearly on tangible assets was introduced.
2.5. Speciﬁc support schemes for promoting offshore wind energy in
EU MSs
As offshore wind is a less mature technology, it is expected in
future to achieve a future high cost reduction. As a consequence
some MSs implemented speciﬁc support schemes or adapted the
remuneration level. Among them are Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. France offers a FiT
for offshore wind farms with an agreement of purchase before 28
May 2014, but actual support to offshore wind farms is currently
available under a tendering scheme.
Belgium offers a TGC support scheme that depends on the
federal government. The minimum price of green certiﬁcates for
an offshore wind power plant is 107€ for the ﬁrst 216 MW and 90€
for capacity exceeding this amount [37]. However, as long as there
is no certiﬁcate market for offshore [38], producers receive the
minimum guaranteed price for certiﬁcates that are ﬁnanced by a
surcharge in electricity bills. Also, additional aid is provided in
Belgium by ﬁnancing the connection costs with a maximum of 25
M€ per project.
In Denmark the sliding FiP is selected based on one of two
following approaches:
 Calls for tender. The subsidy to be received in form of a sliding
FiP is selected by a tender procedure. Past call for tenders
resulted in: 69.5€/MW h for the Horns Rev 2 wind farm, 84.4
€/MW h for Rødsand 2 and 105.1€/MW h in the case of the
Anholt wind farm. At the time of writing two more tenders are
ongoing, for Horns Rev 3 (400 MW) and Kriegers Flak
(600 MW).
 Open-door procedure. Offshore wind farms under the FiP scheme
commissioned after February 2008 receive a premium of 30
€/MW h for 22 000 equivalent full hours plus 3€/MW h for
covering the balancing costs. Also, in coastal projects, a 20%
share of the ownership of the project has to be offered to local
residents or companies [37]. If this share achieves 30%, an extra
bonus of 1.3€/MW h can be awarded over the FiP [24]. In the
same sense, guarantees for loans taken out by local owners areprovided by the Danish transmission system operator, Energi-
net.dk.
In Italy, the fare to be received during 25 years is determined by
a tendering scheme with a base price for offshore projects of 165
€/MW h. In order to be admitted to the tender process, bidders
have to offer a reduction over the base price between 2–30%. No
commercial offshore wind farm exists yet in Italy.
In the Netherlands, offshore wind farms can apply for the
subsidy under the same speciﬁc tender procedure applicable for
onshore. In this case, offshore wind farms applying at the Stages
1–3 receive the same remuneration as onshore wind farms (see
Table 4). However, the tariff is different for the next stages: 137.5
€/MW h, 162.5€/MW h and 187.5€/MW h, respectively for the
fourth, ﬁfth and sixth stages. The subsidy is granted for a period of
15 years and a maximum of 3000 equivalent hours each year.
Under the current scheme, offshore wind farms compete with the
remaining technologies under the 3.5 b€ cap mentioned in the
previous section. However, a new tender with speciﬁc budget for
just offshore is expected to enter into force by July 2015 [39].
In the United Kingdom, offshore wind farms are also eligible to
support via TGCs or the new CfDs scheme. Two certiﬁcates are
issued per MW h (i.e. 0.5 MW h/certiﬁcate) generated by an off-
shore wind farm, which will be modiﬁed in 2015/2016 to
0.53 MW h and ﬁnally to 0.55 MW h after 2016.3. Grid issues
This section presents grid issues regarding grid connection
(procedure and cost allocation) and operation (priority use of the
grid and balancing).
3.1. Grid connection
The general procedure for grid connection in most European
countries is basically as shown in Fig. 2 [40]. After performing the
basic technical project of the wind farm, the plant developer sends
the application to the system operator. In a feasibility study the
system operator examines whether the network conditions
existing at the planned point of connection are technically ade-
quate. If the technical requirements of the electrical system at the
intended connection point are not adequate, the grid operator
furnishes evidence of this inadequacy and proposes the necessary
modiﬁcations or network reinforcements. Following this feasibility
study, the formal connection offer is proposed.
The allocation of grid connection costs impacts renewable
energy schemes more than conventional generators because
renewable energy projects are more sensitive to any increase in
capital costs [15].
As shown in Fig. 3, there are different approaches for sharing
costs of grid connection between producers and grid operators [41]:
 Shallow cost approach. The plant developer bears the cost of
equipment necessary to connect the generator to the nearest
point on the already existing grid network. On the other hand,
the grid owner will bear the cost of any grid reinforcement that
would be necessary to integrate the new generator.
 Super-shallow approach: plant developers only have to bear the
costs of the inner electrical infrastructure including the plant
substation. Expansion of the grid to the connection point and
reinforcement is borne by the grid operator.
 Deep cost approach: plant developers have to bear all connec-
tion costs, as well as any further reinforcement expenses that
can arise as a consequence of integrating the generator in the
electrical system.
Fig. 2. General connection procedure for wind power plants.
Fig. 3. Approaches for cost allocation of grid connection.
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two above-mentioned methodologies. Mainly, the plant devel-
oper bears the cost of grid extension to the assigned connection
point, plus a proportion of the reinforcement costs.
Table 6 summarises the cost distribution of grid connection in
EU MSs. In those countries with speciﬁc regulation for offshore
wind energy, the connection procedure differs. The following
considerations apply for offshore wind farms:
 In Belgium the plant developer bears the costs of the grid
connection to the onshore substation (shallow approach).Nevertheless, these costs are partially subsidised by 33% of the
investment up to a maximum of 25 M€. The subsidy is spread
over ﬁve years (by providing 20% each year).
 In Denmark, for the further-offshore ongoing tenders, the
transmission system operator bears the costs of grid connection
to the offshore substation (ultra-shallow approach) [43]. How-
ever, plant developers of near-shore projects, either established
by tenders or by the open-door procedure, have to bear the
costs of their own offshore substation and connection to land
(shallow approach) [37].
 In Germany, the costs of grid connection are born by the grid
operator (ultra-shallow approach). The connection of new
Table 6
Distribution of the connection costs and reinforcement between plant and system operators (PD: Plant developer; GO: Grid operator) [24,42].
Connection Reinforcement Approach Comments
GO PD GO PD
AT X X Deep
BE X X Shallow Offshore connection costs partially subsidised
BG X X Shallow
CY X X Deep
CZ X X Deep
DE X X Shallow Plant developer bears cost to closest connection point. If grid operator requires a different point of connection,
grid operator bears the additional costs
DK X X X Shallow Plant developer bears a cost equivalent to the costs that would be incurred if his plant was connected to the
medium voltage grid. The remainder is borne by the grid operator
EE X X Deep Reported lack of regulation regarding responsibilities of grid reinforcement
ES X X Shallow
FI X X Deep No clear rules: grid reinforcement borne by plant developer if it is for the only beneﬁt of the plant
FR X X Shallow
GR X X Shallow
HR X X Deep
HU X X Shallow
IE X X Shallow
IT X X Shallow
LT X X X Deep–shallow Plants operators contribute with no more than 10% of the costs of reinforcement
LU X X Deep
LV X X Deep
MT X X Deep
NL X X Shallow
PL X X Shallow Despite grid operator is responsible of upgrading the network, rules are not clear
PT X X Shallow
RO X X Shallow
SE X X Deep Grid reinforcement borne by plant developer if it is for the only beneﬁt of the plant
SI X X Shallow
SK X X X Deep–Shallow Costs of reinforcement are shared between plant and system operators
UK X X Deep–Shallow Plant operators pay the Connection Charges to grid operators distributed over timea
a Just for power plants connected to the transmission grid. Wind power plants connected to the distribution system are charged depending on the location of the
connection point.
Table 7
Priority/guaranteed access and balancing responsibility for energy produced by renewable sources in EU MSs (Y: Yes; N: No).
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU HR IE IT LT LV LU MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
Priory/guaranteed access Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N
Balancing responsibility N Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y
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Capacity allocations up to 7.7 GW are possible till end 2017 and
6.5 GW afterwards till 2020.
 In the Netherlands the cost of the connection is borne by the
plant developer (shallow approach).
 In the UK the transmission infrastructure to shore is (in general)
built by the developer, and then outsourced (through a tender)
to other entities that receive a transmission fee.
3.2. Operation and use of the grid by wind energy generators
The wind generator's revenue is linked to the volume of energy
sold. In this sense, there are two main aspects related with use and
operation of the grid that can mitigate the volume risk due to
externalities: priority of access to the grid and curtailment. Some
MSs establish conditions for priority access to the grid by renew-
able installations by either the priority access (in presence of
purchase contracts with transmission operators) or guaranteed
access (when the wind generators participate in the market).
Table 7 shows those countries that offer preferential access for the
transmission of energy produced by renewable energy sources.
Table 7 also shows that in some MSs, wind operators are required
to cover balancing responsibilities. Nevertheless, the ability of
wind generators to participate in this process is linked to thedesign of the market. Mature intraday markets, with a proper level
of liquidity allow wind generators to better react to market signals
[44], since wind production forecast errors decrease with short
lead-times. The new Guidelines on State aid for environmental
protection and energy 2014–2020 [23] from the European Com-
mission introduce the obligation for large RES to be subject to
balancing obligations on the conditions that liquid balancing
markets exist.3.3. Potential barriers for wind energy deployment
The effectiveness of support mechanisms is not just related to
the remuneration provided: other drivers and factors have a
considerable inﬂuence on the diffusion of renewable energy
technologies. Barrier can be classiﬁed according to the following
categories:
 Political and economic framework. Most issues about reliability
of the regulatory framework are related with abrupt changes
and/or retroactive measures previously as the introduced in
Section 2. A subsequent issue of the lack of reliability is the
difﬁcult access to ﬁnancing in those markets that do not offer
enough guaranties.
Table 8
Main barriers for wind energy diffusion reported in EU MS (collected from [42,46,48]).
Potential barriers MS Potential barriers
AT – Spatial and environmental planning
– Cost of administrative procedure
IE – Duration of grid connection procedure
– Curtailment
BE – Uncertainty of the support scheme
– Long lead time for grid connection
– Complexity of administrative procedure
IT – Long lead time for grid connection
– Grid development
BG – Retroactive measures
– Lack of fair and independent regulation
– Lack of transparency on the connection procedure
LT – Reliability of the regulatory framework
– Complex administrative procedure
– Long lead time for grid connection
CY – No support scheme for wind energy
– Lack of electricity market competition
– Complexity of administrative procedure
LU  Spatial planning
CZ – Support scheme cancelled
– Retroactive measures
– Transparency of the administrative procedure
LV – Reliability of the regulatory framework




– Spatial and environmental planning
MT – No support scheme for wind energy
DK NL – Reliability of the general RES strategy
– Grid development
– Spatial planning
EE – Lack of reliable support scheme
– Complex connection procedure
– Complex administrative procedure
PL – Reliability of the regulatory framework
– Long administrative procedure
– Grid development
ES – Lack of reliable support scheme
– Retroactive measures
– Grid development
– Complex administrative procedure
PT – Reliability of the regulatory framework
– Long and complex administrative procedure
– Long and complex connection procedure
FI – Spatial planning
– Complex connection procedure
– Grid development
RO – Retroactive measures
– Lack of market competition
– Grid development
– Lack of transparency of the grid connection procedure
FR – Lack of stable support
– Complex administrative procedure
– Long lead time for grid connection
SE – Low remuneration level
– Grid development
GR – Lack of reliable support scheme
– Retroactive measures (for other RES)
– Grid development
– Complexity administrative procedure
SI – Reliability of the regulatory framework
– Duration of the administrative process
– Spatial and environmental planning
HU – Lack of reliable support scheme
– No call for tenders since 2007
– Grid development
– Transparency of the connection procedure
SK – Reliability of the general policy for RES-E
– Transparency of the connection procedure
HR ● No new purchase agreements from January 2015
● Cost of connection procedure
● Spatial planning
UK – Long and costly administrative procedure
– Insufﬁcient total budget for large scale RES support
– Costly connection costs
Fig. 4. Cumulative onshore wind power installed in 2014 and NREAPs estimations for 2014 and 2020 (top). Deviation (%) of cumulative onshore installed capacity from 2014
NREAPs estimations (below).
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Fig. 5. Cumulative offshore wind power installed in 2014 and NREAPs estimations for 2014 and 2020 (top). Deviation (%) of cumulative offshore installed capacity from 2014
NREAPs estimations (below).
Fig. 6. Actual and planned renewable energy share and 2012 and 2020 targets.
3 The RE-frame database is an online tool (associated with the European Pro-
jects DiaCore and 2020 Keep-on-track) where stakeholders can report (or validate
existing) barriers as well as adding recommendations. Additionally, competent
authorities can acknowledge or refute the reported issue.
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considered as a possible barrier in some MSs. The underlying
reason is, in most cases, the adoption of a non-shallow cost
model for grid connection. Issues related to long duration of the
connection process are mainly caused by complex or inefﬁcient
procedures (large number of administrations to contact or
excessive amount of steps). In Bulgaria and Slovakia developers
complained about a moratorium for connecting new renewable
installations to the electrical grid. Issues related to curtailment
have been reported in 13 MSs. Furthermore, in 7 MSs (Belgium,
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia) there
is a lack of regulation concerning curtailment and in 4 MS
(Belgium, Italy, Poland and Portugal) compensation is not
provided in case of energy curtailment [42]. Grid development
is also a common barrier for further deployment of wind.
Usually, the growth rate of installed renewable sources is higher
than the rate of development or reinforcement of the electrical
grid. This problem is compounded if wind resources (and
therefore wind farms) are located far from consumption centres
(as it happens in countries such as Finland, Greece and Italy).
 Market structure. As renewable energy generators become sig-
niﬁcant players in the energy markets, higher participation in
the electricity and balancing markets is required to encour-
age overall system cost effectiveness and to steer efﬁcient
investment decisions. However, if wind operators taking on
balancing responsibilities are exposed to non-competitive bal-
ancing prices, only a proper design of the electricity market may
avoid unduly penalisation due to the variable and non-
manageable nature of the wind. Thus, trading close to real-
time is particularly important since generation forecastssigniﬁcantly improve closer to production time. In this sense,
the existence of intra-day markets is necessary in order to
minimise the cost of balancing for wind generators and reduce
support needs.
 Administrative process. Duration of the permitting process is
mainly related with the approval and scope of the environ-
mental impact assessment, compliance with spatial planning
and the number of authorities to contact. In some cases inter-
ferences with aviation radars can compound the problem (this
issue has been reported in Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom).
According to the results provided by the DiaCore project [45]
(based on the interactive database, RE-frame.eu [46],3), issues
related with the political and economic framework are the most
relevant barriers for wind energy diffusion. Issues related to
market and grid structure as well as grid regulation and infra-
structure have a lower relevance. Finally, the aspects regarding
administrative processes are considered as the less relevant bar-
rier. These results are in concordance with the study performed by
Lüthi and Prässler [47], which concluded that project developers
rank legal security as the most important barrier, remuneration as
second and administrative process duration as third. A summary of
most relevant barriers for further wind energy deployment (the
Fig. 7. Annual deployment of onshore wind energy and evolution of support schemes in EU MSs countries.
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Table 8.4. Wind energy deployment: evolution of support schemes,
installed capacity and current state in order to meet the 2020
targets.
This section provides an analysis on the progress of wind
energy installations in the EU countries. The aim is to compare
regulatory framework (and its evolution over time) in each
Member State with actual rates of deployment. In addition, an
analysis of both regulatory framework and installation rates along
with the trajectories (deﬁned by annual intermediary objectives)
set in each NREAP is presented.
Fig. 4 shows a comparison of the actual onshore installed
capacity4 with the amount planned in the NREAPs for 2014 and
2020. As can be observed 10 countries met with the planned
capacity for 2014 and three MSs (Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) did
not meet the objectives with a deviation higher than 50%. How-
ever, in absolute numbers, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and
Portugal (with a deviation of 3429 MW, 1736 MW, 1385 MW and
688 MW, respectively) were the countries that most deviated from
the planned capacity for 2014. Fig. 5 shows — for those countries
that considered the allocation of offshore capacity in their NREAPs4 Installed capacity data provided in this paper correspond to ﬁgures updated
at the end of 2013.by 2020 — the same indicators for offshore wind energy. As can be
observed, just Denmark, Sweden (that almost doubled the esti-
mated capacity by 2014) and the United Kingdom are in line with
the deﬁned trajectory. The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany
reached about the half of the planned capacity. France, Italy and
Spain planned to have installed 2000 MW, 129 MW and 50 MW,
respectively, by 2014. However there are no offshore wind farms
operating yet in these Member States.
Unlike the ﬁnal target on renewable energy share by 2020,
trajectories and technology mix used by each MS are not binding.
Therefore, deviations for some technologies can be balanced with
other renewable energy sources. Thus the current state of
deployment should be put into context by taking also into account
the progress in the other renewable energy sources.
Fig. 6 shows the progress status of renewable energy share.5 As
it can be observed in some cases there are some differences
between the progress status regarding wind energy and ﬁnal
energy share. This is the case, for example, of Hungary or Greece
that were considerably above of the 2012 target. In other coun-
tries, as Portugal, the Netherlands or Spain, the gaps are similar for
both wind energy and total renewable energy.
These ﬁgures imply that even in case some counties will be
able to compensate the deviations on wind energy with other
renewable sources, in most cases wind energy remains a strategic
technology in order to meet the 2020 targets.5 Figures correspond to 2012, since no updated data was available at the time
of writing this document.
Fig. 8. Annual deployment of offshore wind energy and evolution of support schemes in EU MSs countries.
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bines database) show the progression of yearly installed onshore
capacity in each MS during the period 2000–2014 for onshore and
offshore wind energy, respectively. Above each individual ﬁgure,
the evolution over the studied support schemes applicable in each
country can also be observed. As can be appreciated, the different
policies adopted in each MS have driven to diverse and non-
homogenous proﬁles of yearly installed power. The particularities
of each MSs regarding wind energy deployment and regulatory
framework are detailed below.
Germany: The strong policy framework enabled a rather con-
stant annual installed capacity since the early 2000 s. During this
period, several adaptations of the system took place. Currently,
Germany offers a FiP tailored to the speciﬁc wind resource avail-
ability. This feature has opened new market possibilities by
enabling the placement of new wind turbines in less windy loca-
tions. In 2014 the onshore cumulative capacity was 38,364 MW
above 32,763 MW planned and also above the planned capacity for
2020 ( 35,750 MW). However, for offshore wind energy there is a
gap between the actually installed capacity (1049 MW) in com-
parison with the planned capacity in the NREAP for 2014
(2040 MW).
Spain: was in line with the deﬁned trajectory in the NREAP by
the end of the 2000s. However, several amendments in the reg-
ulatory framework as well as the introduction of retroactive
measures and the suspension of the support scheme in 2012
affected negatively the investors' conﬁdence and the planning of
future projects. In June 2014 a new support scheme entered into
force but it seems unlikely it will stimulate the necessary annual
rate of deployment (around 1500 MW per year) that would be
necessary to meet the capacity set in the NREAP for 2020. Thecurrent gap between planned capacity and actually installed is
3429 MW ( 22,987 MW installed versus 26,416 MW planned). In
addition, the NREAP estimates 3000 MW of offshore wind energy
for 2020. However, there are no offshore wind farms installed
in Spain.
United Kingdom: The deployment of both onshore and offshore
wind installations in the United Kingdom are in line (slightly
above) with the trajectory set in the NREAP: 7953 MW installed
onshore (7540 MW planned by 2014) and 4494 MW installed
offshore (4450 MW planned). In this sense, the TGCs system has
also been effective in attracting new investors in the United
Kingdom.
Italy: Italy changed the TGCs system by a tender scheme in
2013. Italy is comfortably above the trajectory to achieve total
renewable energy share for 2020 [48]. To date 8660 MW have
been installed onshore, above the scheduled amount for 2014
(8280 MW). The new tender scheme considers a maximum annual
allocation of 500 MW for onshore wind energy (if the cap is not
achieved the remaining capacity can be transferred to the next
year) that would allow to meet the 12,000 MW planned for 2020.
The perspectives are different for offshore wind energy: Italy
planned 680 MW of offshore wind energy for 2020 (129 MW by
2014). However no offshore capacity has already been deployed
and no new capacity has been allocated by tenders yet.
France: The installed capacity has progressively increased dur-
ing the 2000 s decade. In 2010 changes in the FiT and conditions
induced a reduction in the annual installed capacity during the
following years. Nevertheless, the introduction of call tenders can
set a more favourable regulatory framework in the next few years.
The current onshore installed capacity is 9258.7 MW (9572 MW
planned). Additionally, in the trajectory to achieve 6000 MW of
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though 1900 MW were awarded by tenders in 2012 and another
1000 MW were awarded in 2014, to date no offshore wind farms
have been installed.
Sweden: Even though the price of certiﬁcates are relatively low
(quota is expected to be revised to encourage higher price of
certiﬁcates), the TGCs in Sweden has been effective in stimulating
the deployment of both onshore and offshore wind energy. There
is 5220 MWof installed power, above 2824 MWestimated by 2014
and very close to the 2020 objective (4365 MW). The situation
is even better for offshore wind energy with 212 MW alrea-
dy installed, exceeding both the estimated capacity for 2014
(118 MW) and 2020 (182 MW).
Portugal: The good deployment achieved during the 2000 s
decade was hindered by several regulatory changes and a mor-
atorium — suspending the FiT for new projects — entered into
force in 2012. Currently there are 4914 MW of onshore installed
power in contrast to 5600 MW planned. There are 75 MW of off-
shore wind energy planned for 2020; however, currently there is
only an experimental offshore wind turbine (2 MW).
Denmark: Although Denmark has already exceeded the onshore
installed capacity set for 2020 (3574 MW already installed versus
2621 MW set in the NREAP for 2020), a positive regulatory fra-
mework is boosting an increasing deployment in the last few
years. However, it is worth noting that due to the early develop-
ments in the 80 s, 460 MW (301 MW from 2005) of old wind
installations were decommissioned in Denmark by the end of
November 2014. An advanced state of deployment is also observed
for offshore wind energy: 1271 MW actually installed in 2014
versus 1256 MW expected for 2014 (and very close of the
1339 MW planned for 2020).
Poland: The TGCs system has enabled high deployment of
onshore wind energy 3834 MW which was installed in 2014, in
line with the 2900 MW planned. The certiﬁcates system is
expected to be phased out and substituted by a tender scheme.
500 MW of offshore wind energy are planned in the NREAP, but
currently there is no offshore installed capacity.
Romania: The TGCs system enabled Romania to be in line with
the trajectory set in the NREAP during the early 2010 s decade.
Romania met the planned capacity for 2014 with 2954 MW
installed above 2880 MW planned. However, several retroactive
measures that can affect the deployment of future projects in
order to meet the 4000 expected by 2020.
Austria: A strong deployment of wind energy took place in the
early 2000 s due to a favourable regulatory framework. However,
in 2006 FiTs and duration of the support were reduced slowing
down the development of new installations. This situation was
reversed with the amendment introduced in 2010 by offering
ﬁnely tuned tariffs and extending the payment period [49]. The
cumulative installed power by the end of 2014 was 2095 MW. This
deployment is above the trajectory set in the NREAP, 1793 MW
for 2014.
The Netherlands: even though since the tender scheme entered
into force the annual installed capacity has increased in the last
few years, there is a signiﬁcant gap with the trajectory to achieve
the targets: 2558 MW installed onshore (versus 3943 MW plan-
ned) and 247 MW installed offshore (in contrast to 940 MW
planned).
Greece: Retrospective measures shattered the positive trend
witnessed until 2011. There is a gap between the planned capacity
for 2014 (3716 MW) and the actual installed (1980 MW). In the
NREAP also 300 MWof offshore installed capacity are projected for
2020. However, to date there are no offshore installations.
Bulgaria: The cumulative capacity installed in 2014 was
690 MW (1115 MW were planned in NREAP). Retrospectivemeasures (detailed above in Section 2.4) were introduced in 2012
affecting the positive trend observed in the previous years.
Ireland: The annual installed capacity remained at similar
values during the last few years but this deployment did not
enable Ireland to achieve the planned capacity for 2014: 2656 MW
planned instead of 2246 MW actually installed. The gap is even
higher in case of offshore wind energy: 25 MW already installed
versus 252 MW planned by 2014.
Belgium: The TGC system established in 2002 enabled a good
deployment of wind installations. The minimum prices of green
certiﬁcates were lowered in 2010 causing a slowdown of new
installations in the following years [49]. Belgium has exceed the
NREAP's estimations for onshore wind energy in 2014 (1387 MW
actually installed versus 617 MW planned). The offshore cumulative
capacity by the end of 2014 was 571 MW (versus 1122 MW planned
by the end of 2014).
Finland: There is an increasing trend since the introduction of
the FiT scheme in 2011. 627 MW was installed by 2014 versus
580 MW planned (considering both onshore and offshore). In
addition, the NREAP deﬁnes 900 MW of offshore wind energy in
2020. However, the current offshore installed capacity accounts for
26.3 MW.
Hungary: Support is available for wind generators by call for
applications. The ﬁrst call for applications allocated 330 MW in
2006. However, a second call to allocate 410 MW was cancelled in
2010 and no new calls have taken place since then. This unfa-
vourable regulatory framework has led to a considerable gap
between the planned trajectory in the NREAP (568 MW by 2014)
and actual installed capacity (330 MW).
Croatia: The FiT system was introduced in 2007 with a positive
response by investors. After the amendment on the support
scheme in 2012 [50] a slowdown trend has been observed. The
cumulative capacity at the end of 2014 was 261 MW (slightly
below the 280 MW planned in the NREAP).
Estonia: By the end of 2014 the cumulative installed capacity in
Estonia was 302.8 MW (below the 400 MW planned in the
NREAP). The cap of maximum energy (600 GW h per calendar
year) subsidised for wind farms, in force under the current FiP
scheme, can prevent the deployment of new installations.
Czech Republic: The positive trend observed until the late
2000 s was reversed by the introduction of retrospective measures
and the ﬁnal abolition of the support scheme in 2014. By the end
of 2014 the cumulative installed capacity was 282 MW (below the
planned 443 MW in the NREAP).
Lithuania: Despite the irregular evolution of installed capacity
during the last few years, Lithuania is close to the planned onshore
capacity for 2014: 280 MW (actually installed) versus 350 MW
(planned). However in 2011 a new cap was introduced: a max-
imum of 500 MW is supported by the scheme till 2020 [48]. From
these 500 MW, around 270 MW were already installed in 2013
plus other 200 MWalready allocated. Therefore, this cap can put at
risk the planned capacity in the NREAP for 2020 (1250 MW).
Cyprus: Installations started in 2010. However, yearly installed
capacity decreased during 2011 and 2012. No new farms were
installed in 2013 and 2014. The onshore cumulative capacity was
146.7 MW by the end of 2014 as compared to the 165 MW planned
in the NREAP.
Latvia: The total cumulative capacity installed in 2014 was just
62 MW. Nevertheless the relatively low capacity planned for 2020
(236 MW, 80 MW by 2014) implies that the targets may be met
with a favourable regulatory framework. However, the system is
under review since 2012 and the scheme is closed to new sub-
missions until 2016 [24,48].
Luxembourg: There is a gap with the trajectory set in the
NREAP: 58 MW installed by 2014 (89 MW planned). Nevertheless,
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131 MW may be achieved.
Slovakia: The regulatory framework was not suitable to enable
a proper deployment of wind energy; just 3.2 MW currently
installed in contrast to 150 MW is expected by 2014 (560
for 2020).
Slovenia: Currently, there is just 2 MW of installed power.
However, the relatively low capacity set in the NREAP for 2020
(106 MW) can be achieved under a favourable regulatory
framework.
Malta: With an unfavourable regulatory framework there are
no commercial wind farms installed in Malta. The lack of support
for wind energy deployment makes unlikely that Malta achieves
the 2020 objectives planned in the NREAP for wind energy
(14 MW onshore and 95 MW offshore).–5. Conclusions
The regulatory framework for wind energy in the EU MSs has
been presented in this paper. The aim is to provide a complete
overview by analysing the main regulatory aspects (support
schemes, grid issues and potential barriers) as well as putting
them in context with the 2020 renewable energy targets. The
study has covered both onshore and offshore wind energy
revealing signiﬁcant differences in the regulatory aspects for both
technologies. Finally, the inﬂuence of the regulatory framework on
the deployment of wind energy in the past years has also been
discussed. The main ﬁndings are summarised below:
 In some countries, recent developments and changes are in line
with the Commission's Guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection and energy by increasing the exposure of
wind generators to market. Two main objectives are sought
when exposing wind generators to market signals:
–
–
–Track technology-cost reduction as well as avoiding over-
compensation and minimising the overall cost of the pro-
gramme. This effect can be achieved by fostering competition
among developers. In this regard, call for tenders or auctions
(as in France, Italy, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom)
are appropriate instruments to track the evolution of tech-
nology and costs.
Requiring wind generators to participate in the electricity
market. Generators that are insensitive to electricity market
signals can distort the bidding process (e.g., compounding
the occurrence of negative prices of electricity), especially in
those systems with high penetration of renewable energy
sources. Even though operating marginal costs of wind are
relatively low, FiP and TGCs enable wind generators to par-
ticipate in the electricity market promoting more generation
when the electricity prices are higher and, conversely, gen-
erating less when prices are lower; with the underlying
beneﬁts for the system. The analysis performed in Section 4 shows a strong link
between a favourable regulatory framework and actual deploy-
ment of wind energy. All main support schemes (FiTs, FiPs and
TGCs) have shown a similar effectiveness in terms of actual
deployment. However, under the transition to a more market
compatibility FiP seems to be the preferred scheme, mainly
because its implementation simplicity and lower risk for inves-
tors than TGCs.
 Despite the best practices provided by the European Commis-
sion guidance for the design of renewables support schemes
[22], a number of countries implemented abrupt changes and
sometimes retroactive and/or retrospective measures hinderingthe investor's conﬁdence and putting at risk the development of
future projects and hence, the likely to meet the 2020 targets.
 As wind energy is deployed, locations with better wind condi-
tions are expected to be taken ﬁrst. If promotion schemes do not
offer the suitable support according to local wind resource,
there is a risk that projects in low wind conditions do not get
enough income or, in the opposite case, projects in favourable
wind conditions can get windfall proﬁts. As an example, the
ﬁne-tuned scheme in Germany has enabled — by extending the
initial period with higher payments for those wind farms
located in less favoured conditions — an increasing deployment
of new projects in low-wind locations. Also, competitive bid-
ding is a suitable measure in order to establish the remunera-
tion according with the speciﬁc conditions of each project.
 In case of offshore wind, call for tenders — as in Denmark,
France, Italy and the Netherlands — or ﬁnned-tuned schemes —
as in Germany — seem to be the most suitable support scheme,
in order to adapt the support according to technological evolu-
tion (since offshore wind is a less mature technology as onshore
wind) as well as tailoring the remuneration to the speciﬁc
conditions of the project (the costs for offshore project are
highly dependent on local conditions and, especially, on the
seabed depth). Additionally, offshore wind farms are usually not
required to bear the costs associated to the extension of the
grid, since the high costs of building a new submarine line may
put excessive ﬁnancial pressure and discourage investors.
 The following remarks can be extracted from the analysis per-
formed over wind energy deployment linked to evolution of
schemes:In most countries support schemes have been continuously
modiﬁed and adapted. Those changes have usually had a
direct inﬂuence on wind energy deployment during the fol-
lowing years. In some Member States changes were made as
a part of a strong strategy to continue supporting wind
energy. Conversely, changes in other countries were moti-
vated by budgetary restrictions (either due to the ﬁnancial
crisis and/or excessive demand of new project due to bad
designed support schemes) causing a clear decrease of new
projects in the following years.
In general terms, the actual role of onshore wind energy is in
line with the trajectory set in the NREAPs: the overall
onshore installed capacity in the EU was 120.57 GW, slightly
above the 118.69 GW planned by 2014 in NREAPs. However,
the situation is completely different with respect to offshore
wind energy: 7.90 GW already installed instead of 12.36 GW
planned. It seems unlikely that the EU countries will achieve
the total expected capacity for offshore wind by 2020
(43.92 GW). Despite some notable exceptions (Sweden, the
United Kingdom and Denmark), all countries have deployed
less than they planned for by 2014. Even worse, in some MSs
with offshore planned capacity for 2020 there is a clear lack
of regulatory framework for offshore wind energy. This fact
may lead to most prospective of planned projects to not
eventually be realised.Acknowledgements
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